

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 179716
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APPROVED BY EUR - GVEST

NSC - RHUNTER

S/S - RPERITO

AF - TSEELYE

NEA - NAVELLIOTES

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R 011906Z AUG 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MADRID

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 179716

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (ANDREOTTI, GIULIO), IT

SUBJECT: ANDREOTTI VISIT

1. EXCEPT FOR PARAGRAPH 2, THE FOLLOWING IS FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND SENIOR EMBASSY PERSONNEL ONLY, BECAUSE OF SENSITIVE NATURE OF SOME ITEMS. IN RESPONDING TO ANY HOST GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES REGARDING ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON JULY 26-27, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON PARAGRAPH 2 AND REFER TO THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT (USIA WIRELESS FILE JULY 27) ISSUED UPON CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT.

2. ALL MEETINGS WERE CONDUCTED IN UPBEAT MANNER, WITH
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BOTH DELEGATIONS EXPRESSING FULL SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAD GONE. THE FIRST DAY WAS DEVOTED TO AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS, DETENTE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. OUR SIDE STRESSED THE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS WITH THE SOVIETS ON ARMS CONTROL RELATED SUBJECTS, ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT REFLECTED IN

SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS. EVEN SO THEIR PUBLIC STANCE SINCE CHARLESTON HAS IMPROVED SOMEWHAT. THE SECOND DAY FOCUSSED ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, ENERGY, AND A COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION ON ITALIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS (TO WH H THE

PRESIDENT RESPONDED BY THANKING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HIS COMMENTS). THE US SIDE CAME AWAY WITH A FIRM IMPRESSION OF THE POLITICAL SKILL OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HIS DEDICATION TO WESTERN COOPERATION AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, HIS DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING OF BROADER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, AND THE IMPROVING STATE OF THE ITALIAN ECONOMY.

3. EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THERE WAS A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, CTB (THE SECRETARY SAID NEGOTIATIONS HAD GONE WELL), AND MBFR. ON THE LATTER, OUR SIDE MADE KNOWN OUR VIEW THAT PROGRESS IN SALT AND MBFR SHOULD PROCEED TOGETHER AND BE MUTUALLY REINFORCING. ANDREOTTI EXPRESSED FIRM SUPPORT FOR OUR HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES AND SAID THAT HUMAN RIGHTS AND DETENTE CAN BE MUTUALLY CONSISTENT. HE SAID PROGRESS ON DETENTE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE ADVOCATED A PHASED APPROACH TO DETENTE, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, AS A WAY TO MAKE GENUINE PROGRESS WITHOUT ARTIFICIALLY RAISING IN EASTERN EUROPE EXPECTATIONS WHICH
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COULD LEAD TO PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS -- AND REACTIONS BY THE SOVIETS -- THAT WOULD MAKE THINGS WORSE INSTEAD OF BETTER. ON THE NEUTRON BOMB, IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE NOT MADE A FINAL DECISION ON PRODUCTION OR DEPLOYMENT. THE US SIDE REJECTED THE NOTION THAT WE MIGHT FIND IT EASIER TO AUTHORIZE USE OF THE NEUTRON BOMB THAN OTHER MORE DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS AND PROMISED TO WEIGH THE VIEWS OF ALLIANCE LEADERS BEFORE MAKING ANY DECISION. IN NOTING DOUBTS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC COMMENTARY, ANDREOTTI URGED THAT ANY DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE NEUTRON BOMB BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR EXPLANATION TO THE WORLD AT LARGE ABOUT THE NATURE, PURPOSES, AND DOCTRINE OF THE WEAPON.

4. MID-EAST. ANDREOTTI WAS BRIEFED ON OUR RECENT MEETINGS WITH MIDDLE EASTERN LEADERS. WE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ANDREOTTI AND OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIED LEADERS WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO GET THE PLO TO ACCEPT UN RESOLUTION 242. ANDREOTTI SAID HE BELIEVED TIME WAS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS AND SUGGESTED THAT IF THE GREAT POWERS JOINED THE UNITED NATIONS IN PROVIDING GUARANTEES IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR ISRAEL TO RETURN TO ITS ORIGINAL BORDERS.

5. HORN OF AFRICA. WE NOTED THAT WE HAVE INFORMED THE SOMALIS IN PRINCIPLE THAT WE SUPPORT THE IDEA OF SUPPLYING ARMS, ALTHOUGH WE INDICATED THAT NATIONAL POLICY HAS NOT BEEN SET. WE WILL CONSULT WITH ITALY, FRANCE AND PERHAPS OTHERS ON A CONCERTED APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM, WHILE

AVOIDING IF POSSIBLE THE IMAGE OF BIG-NATION INVOLVEMENT. ANDREOTTI'S APPROACH WAS FOR ITALY TO CONTINUE WORKING THROUGH THE SAUDIS TO ENCOURAGE STABILITY AND REORIENTATION AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS IN SOMALIA. IN ERITREA, ITALY IS RELUCTANT TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED SINCE MANY ITALIANS CONTINUE TO LIVE THERE AND IN ETHIOPIA GENERALLY.

6. DOMESTIC ITALIAN POLITICS. ANDREOTTI DESCRIBED THE
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SITUATION IN ITALIAN POLITICS FOLLOWING THE JUNE 1976 ELECTIONS. WITH THE SOCIALISTS REFUSING COOPERATION, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (DC) HAD ONLY TWO CHOICES: MOVE FOR NEW EARLY ELECTIONS WITH NO PROSPECT OF EASING THE POLITICAL TENSION, OR GOVERNING ALONE WITH BROAD SUPPORT. FOLLOWING THE LATTER COURSE HAD ENABLED HIS GOVERNMENT TO PASS AN AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND NAME TO KEY DEFENSE POSITIONS OFFICERS WITH UNQUESTIONED FIDELITY TO NATO. THE MOST RECENT AGREEMENT WAS DESIGNED TO CORRECT WEAKNESSES IN ITS POSITION, AND WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE DEPTH OF CONCERN ON PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ORDER. AT THE SAME TIME HIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO RESIST COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST CALLS FOR FORMAL POLITICAL CHANGES. ANDREOTTI HOPED THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD STRENGTHEN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE DC. THIS IN TURN MIGHT INFLUENCE THE SOCIALISTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS TO RETURN TO THE FOLD. HIS GOVERNMENT THEREFORE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH NOT A LITTLE WHILE MAINTAINING STRICT FIDELITY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AND TO WESTERN INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING NATO AND THE EC. SURMISING THAT THE COMMUNIST MOMENTUM MAY HAVE SLOWED, WE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SOLVE PRESSING PROBLEMS, ALSO AT THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS, AND PROMISED CONTINUED COOPERATION AND SUPPORT TO ANDREOTTI'S GOVERNMENT.

7. ENERGY. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO INCLUDE A FULL REPORT ON ENERGY MATTERS IN THE FINAL STATEMENT. EXIM BANK RENEWED ITS OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES IN ENCOURAGING PRIVATE US FINANCING OF ITALY'S NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM; ITALIANS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS INTEREST IN RAISING \$3.5 BILLION OVERALL IN US FINANCIAL MARKETS. EXIM BANK CONFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS TO FINANCE DIRECTLY A SHARE OF THE EXPORT OF
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8. TRADE AND INVESTMENT. WE AGREED TO ENSURE THAT ITALY BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN US DEFENSE PROCUREMENT THAT IS OPENED TO BIDDING BY OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. THE US GOVERNMENT WILL DO ITS PART TO ENCOURAGE

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APPROVED BY: EUR:REBARBOUR

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY VALLETTA

S E C R E T STATE 179716

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT VALLETTA STATE 179716 SENT ACTION ALL NATO CAPITALS, MADRID INFO MOSCOW 01 AUG 77

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UNQUOTE VANCE

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Sent Date: 01-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1429374
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANDREOTTI VISIT
TAGS: OVIP, IT, (ANDREOTTI, GIULIO)
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Type: TE
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